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The information technology revolution is real and in full 
swing on the Korean peninsula.  Like all other nations that 
choose to embrace it, Koreans are compelled to redefine 
their traditional concepts of time, space, speed, 
conversation, and language into the IT-driven notions of 
24-hour daytime, cyberspace, speed of light, pictograms 
(n:n), and digital content.  Information technology connects 
individuals, firms, and governments via information 
networks and shared databanks, thereby facilitating the 
production, distribution, and consumption of information 
within the whole economy and society.   
 
In terms of its transformational impact on the national way 
of life, economy, and culture, the digital revolution of the 
21st century is equivalent to the steel and railroad 
revolutions of the 19th century and the automobile 
revolution of the 20th century.  Through revolutionary 
developments in the creation, distribution, and utilization of 
knowledge and information via the means of advanced 
information technologies, Koreans established whole new 
industries utilizing IT and the Internet, and introduced new 
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ways of doing business in the traditional sectors of 
economy.  They transformed the production cycle “from 
brawn to brain” and the distribution cycle “from paper trail 
to click-and-go.” The digital revolution accelerated 
technological innovation, reduced product cycles, increased 
investment risks, and multiplied returns.  The IT revolution 
raised Korea’s economic competitiveness by facilitating 
better knowledge of one’s customers, suppliers, 
competitors, and technologies; by cutting the production 
costs, distribution costs, administrative and overhead 
expenses; as well as by increasing the productivity of the 
Korean workforce and profitability of Korean companies.   
 
The new digital economic environment also poses new 
problems in socio-economic development, including the 
enormous impact of a growing digital divide on social 
equity and international competitiveness, sets new tasks for 
Korean governments, and calls for a new IT industrial 
policy to transform the Korean peninsula into a global 
leader -- e-Korea.  
 
Without doubt, both Koreas see ICT as a core element of 
domestic developmental strategy, as a major source of 
foreign exchange earnings and, in strategic terms, as a 
source of national power and competitive economic 
advantage, as well as a prerequisite for extending the 
organizational and extractive capacities of the state.  In 
addition, the South uses ICT as a force multiplier in the 
network-centric warfare of the information age and as a 
vehicle for empowering the civil society and promoting 
democracy and social justice in the age of globalization.      
 
South Korea’s Digital Juggernaut  
 
Over the past forty years, Korea has successfully 
modernized and industrialized its economy, which resulted 
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in an unprecedented increase in the per capita income from 
US$ 82 in 1961 to over US$ 10,000 in 2001.  Until the 
mid-1990s, Korea’s accelerated economic growth was 
driven by traditional manufacturing industries such as 
shipbuilding, chemical, and automobile industries.  
However, with the advance of the knowledge-based 
economy in the late 1990s, the information technology 
sector has been playing an increasingly significant role in 
the formation of added economic value and in contributing 
to sustainable economic growth.  
 
Over the past decade, the IT industry grew three times 
faster than the ROK GNP as a whole.  In 2000, the IT 
industry contributed 50.5 percent to the ROK GNP growth, 
and 29.7 percent to the ROK exports.  In 2000, Korean IT 
industry exported US$ 51.2 billion worth of goods and 
services, and IT trade surplus reached US$ 52 billion over 
the past four years (or 61.7% of the ROK’s total trade 
surplus, which was US$ 84 billion, for the same period).  
The development of the IT industry brought on the market 
revolutionary new products ranging from CDMA-based 
mobile telephone handsets (US$ 10.2B in exports in 2000), 
to PCs (US$ 2.8B in exports in 2000), to TFT LCDs (US$ 
3.17B in exports in 2000), to DRAM semiconductor chips 
(US$ 26B in exports in 2000).  It opened the way for new 
telecommunication services, including wireless phones 
(26.82M subscribers in 2000) and broadband Internet (10M 
subscribers in 2002).  It facilitated the development of the 
software industry and gave rise to the “Teheran Valley” in 
Seoul (the official incubator of IT Korea, where there are 
1,500 registered IT companies), as well as “software 
centers” and “soft towns” in the periphery.   
 
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of IT industry resulted in 
diverse spill-over effects, such as activating wired and 
wireless e-commerce (B2B, B2C, G2B, and G4C), 
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digitalizing contents industry (by providing superior 
multimedia contents such as VOD, or video on demand), 
and changing distribution channels.  Finally, the digital 
revolution changes the customary lifestyles of the Korean 
public through the rapid spread of the “PC rooms” (23.5K) 
and Internet Game cafes (10M subscribers and 100K 
simultaneous connectors to the game Lineage, for 
instance), the SMS-driven “thumb talking” (64M SMS 
messages per a day), the “cyber apartments” (more than 
half of all Korean households are connected to the 
broadband Internet), PDAs, mobile commerce, including 
“mobile wallet service” and “e-payment,” the HDTV 
service (1M by 2005) and 3DTV service, and public 
wireless LAN service.  In sum, the shock wave of digital 
technology swept Korea off its feet, Koreans fell in love 
with IT and whole-heartedly embraced the “digital 
miracle.”   
 
What accounts for such a spectacular success in the 
evolution of new economy and digital society in Korea?  
The consensus opinion among conference participants was 
that, first and foremost, it is the ROK government industrial 
policy aimed at promoting the digital economy through the 
creation and expansion of connectivity, capacity, and 
content.  In particular, the ROK government built the 
national backbone, subsidized the upgrading of the 
telecommunication infrastructure “from giga bps to tera 
bps” nationwide, and set up data backup centers for four 
major national information systems, including resident 
registration.  It spent over one billion U.S. dollars to 
develop human capacity, i.e., IT skills among over ten 
million Korean citizens, especially in the military service, 
public education and health care, as well as government 
administration.  The government took a leading role in the 
R&D of five key IT technologies, including 4th generation 
mobile communications, high-speed fiber-optic subscriber 
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networks, SmarTV, next generation servers, and next 
generation data security systems.  Also, the government 
invests heavily in emerging technologies and new 
IT/BT/NT startups and venture funds designed to integrate 
IT and next-generation industries such as biotechnology 
(for instance, bio-chip) and nanotechnology (for instance, 
pyroelectric nano-devices).  Further, it provided critical 
technical assistance to small and medium enterprises with 
IT planning and deployment through its “small corporation 
network program” for three million SMEs.  Finally, the 
government promoted market competition in the IT 
industry through market liberalization and privatization of 
Korea Telecom; it established a “digital government” by 
completing eleven essential tasks of the electronic 
government and subsidizing civil service, innovation 
service, and government integrated procurement service; 
and it created a reliable legal framework enabling the 
commercial success of digital economy by facilitating 
online document exchange, legalizing electronic signatures 
and e-payments, establishing security and authentication 
protocols and enforcement mechanisms, and ensuring 
privacy protection.   
 
What are the challenges facing the IT industry in Korea 
today?  It is highly dependent on imports of core 
components and raw materials.  Korean IT companies 
spend a high proportion of their revenues on foreign license 
fees.  Domestic demand is, by and large, saturated.  Korea 
is heavily dependent on exports to specific regions, 
primarily North America and China.   Can the Korean 
private sector overcome these challenges?  The answer is 
positive because Korea has a highly skilled work force, 
well-developed front-end industries, tremendous know-how 
in mass production technology, and prompt decision-
making regarding investment in high-tech.   
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What are the “soft issues” facing the ROK government in 
managing the digital revolution?  The fundamental task is 
to bridge the emerging digital divide and promote social 
equity between “the digitally rich and poor” through IT 
literacy and training programs for low-income men and 
women, the elderly, and the disabled at community IT 
access centers and public institutions.  The government will 
have to promote both English and Chinese literacy as a way 
of ensuring public access to the World Wide Web. At last, 
digital revolution raises new issues and contributes to 
further democratization of the ROK political system and 
globalization of the ROK society.   
 
North Korea’s IT Dreams and Realities  
 
The North Korean government launched the construction of 
a modern telecommunications sector more than half a 
century ago. But, at present, the DPRK’s telephone, 
telegraph, telex, photo-telegraph, railroad, and radio relay 
communication networks are largely equipped with 
obsolete Soviet and Chinese-made equipment of the 1950s-
1960s vintage, which exhausted its life warranties and 
resource potential and functions on a whim and a prayer.  
The sector is deprived of any new government financing 
and is faced with unreliable electricity supply and severe 
deficits in modern equipment, spare parts, elementary 
components, and raw materials.  The existing DPRK 
telecommunication networks are highly unreliable and 
inaccurate, inefficient, cost-insensitive, labor extensive, 
consumer-ignorant, underdeveloped, function erratically, 
and frequently break down.  There is no nationwide unified 
telecommunications network with duplicate and mutually 
interchangeable components for emergencies in the North.  
 
The North Korean telecommunication sector was designed 
and built for governmental and industrial use, and does not 
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need the consumer for the industry’s survival and 
development.  Its primary purpose, especially its content 
components like radio- and television-broadcasting 
services, is to serve the interests of Kim’s ruling clan and 
the Workers’ Party of Korea, by covering the entire country 
with a comprehensive spider web of ideological and 
political propaganda aimed at brainwashing people in every 
corner of the DPRK.  Organizational uncertainties in terms 
of the subordination of various elements of the 
telecommunication infrastructure and constant bureaucratic 
turf battles for pre-eminence and control in the sector, as 
well as frequent bureaucratic infighting for access to 
limited and costly telecommunication facilities make the 
tasks of guidance, supervision, coordination, and 
administration of telecommunications policies even more 
difficult to achieve.   
 
On a brighter side, one cannot ignore the fact that despite 
all the problems facing the telecommunications sector, an 
ordinary North Korean peasant living in every one out of 
three remote villages still can make a telephone call to 
Pyongyang, even though the call is low quality and has 
delayed connection and frequent interruptions. Every town 
resident can still make a long distance call to Moscow or 
Beijing.  The DPRK does have several dozen modern 
telecommunications facilities and academic research 
institutes with sophisticated telecommunications 
equipment, allowing them access to and use of modern 
telecommunications technologies, including wireless radio 
and telephone, satellite communications, and the Internet.  
These achievements are not spectacular, especially if 
compared to those in the South, but most of the 
governments and populations in the Third World would 
envy them.  The real puzzle is how the North Korean 
telecommunications personnel are still able to maintain in 
good working condition most of the telecommunications 
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facilities and equipment, despite enormous material, 
technical, and financial difficulties facing them today.  
 
ROK’s Digital Defense Revolution 
 
The IT revolution brought dramatic changes in modern 
warfare, making it increasingly network-centric and 
elevating information superiority to the status of the sine 
quo non of desired military capabilities.   Real-time 
communications can tie global capabilities simultaneously 
to multiple sets of specific forces at a local place and time.  
Common battlespace awareness, resulting from common 
operating picture, and assured, streamlined, and highly-
networked retrieval and dissemination of real-time 
information allow for a greatly accelerated operational 
tempo, as well as more accurate identification of friend and 
foe on the battlefield.  Real-time, sensor-to-shooter 
coupling, enabled by wideband links and intelligent 
databases, reduce the number of critical nodes manned by 
humans.  The concentration of fires enabled by precision-
guided munitions make the battlespace more lethal and 
more dispersed, while freeing the source of combat power 
from the physical location of battlespace assets or entities.  
Instead of the massing of forces, the IT allows for the 
massing of effects.  As a result, military forces and their 
support units can be much more effective despite their 
reduced battlefield footprint.  The risks of warfare 
associated with easy-to-attack friendly targets decrease 
dramatically.   
 
The IT revolution is the driving force behind the ongoing 
defense digitization and unfolding revolution in military 
affairs in the ROK armed forces, causing transformational 
changes in weapons systems, especially the C4ISR 
organizational structures, and military doctrine.   
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First, C4ISR systems are indispensable for the development 
of the knowledge-based defense system, especially for the 
creation of the common operational picture for integrated 
air, sea, and ground operations, which is the key to success 
in modern network-centric warfare.  The ROK armed 
forces are least invested in the development of the observe 
phase of C4ISR assets (with exception of the recently 
fielded SIGINT system called “PaekDoo” and IMINT 
system called “KeumGang”), especially in the area of 
strategic ISR assets, which are totally dependent on the 
USFK and CFC.  As for the orient, decide, and act phases 
of C4ISR, the ROK armed forces introduced digitized 
command, control, and communications systems in a top-
down manner.  They started with the implementation of 
TACCIMS at the CFC in July 1991, and Korean Joint 
Forces Command and the Services’ Headquarters in 
December 1991, and later upgraded to the GCCS-K.  Then, 
in 1999, they fielded the CPAS for use by echelons above 
corps.  The ROK Air Force fielded the MCRC (Master 
Control Reporting Center) system for command and control 
over air operation in a grand approach in 1986, with the 
second batch to be fielded in 2002.  The ROK Navy fielded 
the KNTDS for command and control of naval operations 
in an incremental approach in 1996, with the second batch 
to be implemented in 2003.  The ROK Army is developing 
its tactical C4I systems to be fielded from 2004-2006 in an 
evolutionary approach.   Recently, through the 
implementation of CALS (Computer-Aided Logistic 
System), the ROK armed forces have successfully digitized 
munitions and logistics and are now proceeding rapidly 
with digitization of the maintenance service system, 
administrative support system, and personnel education.   
 
At the tactical level, the ROK military began to construct a 
digitized defense infrastructure by improving mobile 
telecommunication system for tactical units in the field.  
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The core of this project is to improve the existing tree-type 
communication system into a grid-type system and to 
upgrade mobile voice communication system to 
simultaneous mobile voice communication and laptop data 
transfer system. With the completion of this digitized 
defense infrastructure, the ROK armed forces will have all 
tactical units linked in a unified digital network.   
 
The ROK military IT experts admit that the ROK armed 
forces lack indigenous experience in developing their own 
C4ISR systems in all four phases.  In general, the ROK 
MND approach is that it is more desirable to cultivate 
powerful software rather than to construct deluxe physical 
hardware systems because of budgetary limitations, 
technological constraints, and rapid IT advances in the 
commercial sector.  They usually benchmark the advanced 
foreign C4ISR systems and attempt to design domestically 
their own systems by learning the lessons from foreign 
R&D and application experiences.  Alternatively, they 
procure systems developed commercially by foreign 
developers or by FMS cases from the U.S. government. 
This notwithstanding, they consider purchasing a whole 
foreign common operating environment system to be the 
least desirable option.  At the same time, they believe that 
the U.S. restrictions on the release of technical information 
constitute a major impediment to further development of 
C4ISR systems in the ROK armed forces.  They urge more 
military technical personnel exchanges and combined 
military-technical research programs involving military, 
academic, defense research institutes, and defense-industry 
representatives.   
 
The ROK armed forces recognize the importance of the 
interoperability problem along the “compatibility-
integration continuum.” The joint interoperability problem, 
which exists between the ROK Army, Air Force, and Navy, 
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is believed to be purely technical in essence.  If joint 
interoperable service capabilities are to be emphasized in 
future warfare, the current hybrid type C4ISR architectures 
can be harmonized through the use of the same hardware 
and shared software.  However, at present, the joint 
interoperability problem is exacerbated by the absence of a 
principal organization to drive the interoperability issues 
within the ROK armed forces, by the lack of standards, 
plans, and procedures for the development of Korean 
common operating environment, as well as by competitive 
demands, scarce budgetary resources, and time pressures 
faced by various services.   
 
In contrast, the combined interoperability problem between 
the ROK armed forces and USFK is not only technical, but 
also military-political in nature.  From a technical 
standpoint, it does not matter whether a particular C4ISR 
system is a U.S. or ROK product as long as they are 
compatible and can exchange information through shared 
software.  This notwithstanding, system interoperability 
may present a major design issue if the designer knows 
only what information he needs to receive from or transmit 
to operate, while each system keeps its own procedures 
secret from associated systems.  In this case, the designer is 
tasked to provide means for free information transfer 
between the combined systems, while ensuring that the 
transfer is limited only to the information agreed upon by 
both systems.  Hence, designs for interoperability must be 
based on mutual agreements, not on standards.   
 
The problem arises out of the fact that Washington and 
Seoul may want to have independent C4ISR systems 
appropriate for the U.S. and ROK armed forces, 
respectively, which are separate and not fully integrated -- 
not just to assure the overall security and reliability of 
computer networks (which can be done by other technical 
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means) but, foremost, because of their potential policy 
disagreements about threat perceptions, future force 
missions, and fundamental national security concerns.  For 
example, as long as the CFC combined operations are 
driven by the assessment of the North Korean threat, the 
need to develop a CCOE on the basis of shared information 
technologies, applications, systems, and architectures is 
clear.  But, what if, following Korean unification, a new 
geopolitical situation were to drive a unified Korea away 
from its lop-sided dependence on the military-strategic 
alliance with the United States?   Will combined 
interoperability in C4ISR systems between the ROK armed 
forces and USFK, assuming their continuing presence on 
the Korean peninsula even after reunification, become an 
asset or liability in the long run?  Or, more generally, if 
future missions for the U.S.-ROK combined operations 
cannot be determined yet, how and in which directions can 
one promote combined interoperability?  Thus, the 
questions “how much interoperability is needed now, and 
how much interoperability is enough in general?” cannot be 
answered on purely technical grounds and must be 
periodically reassessed taking into account evolving 
geopolitical situation around and outside the Korean 
peninsula.  In other words, the course of IT revolution in 
Korea will be influenced by the ROK designation of its 
friends and enemies after reunification.   
 
Some early indications about Korean hesitations on the 
issue of combined interoperability can be seen in the fact 
that the ROK armed forces demoted the JFC Defense 
Digitization Planning Bureau to department status in 
September 2002, as well as the fact that the ROK MND 
promotes the idea of minimizing Korean dependence on 
foreign (read U.S.) systems and has an explicit policy on 
Information Technology Systems acquisition favoring 
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domestic developers and manufacturers using domestic 
standards and patents.    
 
One should not expect from defense digitization an answer 
to every problem.  For example, defense digitization is not 
a panacea for the “political-military coordination problem.”  
In theory, as a result of the real-time communications, 
fully-integrated digital networks, and a click of a mouse, 
the President can share the common battlespace awareness 
with a platoon leader who, in turn, can easily learn of the 
President’s political intent.  But, in practice, defense 
digitization can hardly eliminate room for bureaucratic 
distortions and outside political manipulations.   
 
Finally, the IT revolution transforming the ROK economy 
and society greatly influences various RMA initiatives 
emanating from the ROK Ministry of National Defense, 
including the work of the National Defense Reform 
Committee formed in April 1998 and the thinking of the 
NDRC RMA Group formed in April 1999, as well as the 
publication of the ROK Air Force Vision 2025, the ROK 
Army Vision 2010 (II), and the ROK Navy Vision 2020.  
However, the conference consensus was that the ROK 
RMA looks “very active in terms of conceptual 
development, but, in practice, it is just approaching the 
starting line, concentrating on initial studies of the RMA 
experiences of the advanced countries.”  
  
KPA’s IT Innovations of the Juch’e Style 
 
One can make four basic assumptions about recent IT 
developments in North Korea.  First, the Korean People’s 
Army gets the best of the available resources; therefore, if 
the military wants the technology and equipment to handle 
information, it gets more and better than the civilian sector.  
Second, the KPA closely studied the conduct of recent U.S. 
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military operations from the Persian Gulf to Kosovo to 
Afghanistan, in which IT played an increasingly important 
role; therefore, the general IT interests of the North Korean 
military may be focused on the core areas of defense 
digitization within the U.S. and ROK armed forces, 
including C4ISR, logistics and support, network security, 
and personnel education.  Third, the KPA, like the civilian 
sector, is also faced with severe resource and foreign 
exchange shortages, as well as with multi-layered 
international embargoes on trade and technology transfers.  
Fourth, the KPA seems to be particularly interested in using 
the information technology for two purposes: on the one 
hand, to accentuate its asymmetric advantages in war-
fighting, especially in such areas as non-conventional 
weapons, special forces, and forward-based artillery, in 
order to strengthen their deterrent potential and, on the 
other hand, to promote its political goals, including the 
possibility of stepping in and taking over the country 
leadership if Kim Jong Il is no longer in power. 
 
Despite a long SIGINT history, the presence of significant 
SIGINT, EW, and EIW capabilities, and a high-level 
awareness on the part of the DPRK’s supreme political and 
military leadership of the importance of strong and active 
C4ISR assets, the KPA seems to be only “modestly 
digitized.” It is still predominantly an “analog and tube 
force” equipped with “appropriate” technology, often going 
back to the days of the Korean War, not “cutting edge” 
technology.  The level of IT expertise within the KPA and 
the North Korean defense industry is low, and we tend to 
overestimate it significantly.  Grossly underdeveloped 
electronics and computer industrial infrastructure, morally 
and physically obsolete and dysfunctional national 
telecommunications infrastructure, perennial national 
macro-economic crisis, virtual collapse of the nationwide 
power grid, a closed and highly politicized society, and 
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interagency rivalries, present considerable obstacles in 
continued development of IT-based C4ISR and EIW 
capabilities.  Also, the lack of system integration is key to 
the KPA’s overall failure.  Although one should expect that 
the North Korean arms manufacturers will attempt to apply 
IT to weapons development and manufacture, especially 
sensor technology and precision guidance technology.  
Because of its relatively modest levels of computerization 
and telecommunications, any IT-driven enhancements that 
the KPA undertakes in C4ISR systems, network security, 
logistics, and munitions have the potential to leapfrog 
several generations and present a significant force 
multiplier on the modern battlefield.    
 
Far from creating horizontal information-centered networks 
among combat entities (people, equipment, organizations), 
the KPA is expected to use information technology to 
improve its existing top-down command and control 
hierarchies and to tighten the security of and access to real-
time information dissemination.  Instead of establishing 
common battlespace awareness among various KPA 
services and military units at the operational and tactical 
levels, IT is likely to be used to advance one-man real-time 
battlespace knowledge and assessment resulting in single-
handed action though “millions of precision-guided human 
bullets.” Kim Jong Il would be able to receive real-time 
reports (possibly through a hybrid paging-computer 
system) from each and every tactical unit and issue direct 
orders on his personal authority to every soldier and sailor.  
Of course, in practice, this architectural design may result 
in uncontrolled chaos and defeat on a battlefield.   
 
It is worth noting that as the DPRK moves into the 
computer age, modernizes its telecommunication 
capabilities, and enhances its C4ISR capabilities with IT 
elements, it will inevitably increase its dependence on 
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foreign information technologies and thus its own 
vulnerabilities.  From the military standpoint, the spread of 
IT within the KPA could open another avenue by which 
North Korea could be attacked.  Whereas it is difficult for 
an enemy force to attack and destroy an underground 
munitions factory, it may be possible to electronically 
attack a digitized underground facility through 
communication channels and disrupt its operations, even 
despite hardened network security.  From the social-
political standpoint, the IT revolution is likely to “wreak 
havoc with the policy of total secrecy” and to expose the 
North Korean society and the military to political 
“contamination” from the outside world, despite all 
government attempts to insulate domestic intranets from 
the World Wide Web and to monitor Web use by 
authorized users, especially among the military.  
 
Bridging the Digital Divide and the U.S. Policy 
 
The IT revolution brought about a multi-layered digital 
divide on the Korean peninsula.  It is obvious that the ICT 
(information and communication technologies) gap 
between the North and the South is widening dramatically.  
Whereas the ROK is a global leader in the IT revolution 
and is one of the most “wired, digitized, and networked” 
countries in the world, the DPRK is scarcely “wired or 
computerized” and is one of the most isolated and atomized 
nations of earth.   
 
In the North, the digital divide in terms of access to 
computers, functioning telecommunication lines, and the 
Internet and various intranets is deep and formidable.  In 
particular, there are dramatic differences in access and 
usage between the party super-elite “voyeurs” on global 
affairs and the rest of the population, between the military 
cadres and civilian workforce, between the residents of 
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Pyongyang and the periphery, between urban and rural 
residents, and between younger and older generations.  The 
DPRK government severely limits and strictly controls 
access to and use of ICT, which remains largely a function 
of political clout and financial muscle.  Therefore, it is a 
good indicator of where a particular institution or 
individual stands in the North Korean power hierarchy and 
whether or not they have the capacity to purchase 
telecommunications equipment and services in cash.   
 
In the South, too, there are significant strata of the 
population, especially the poor, the elderly, and women, 
who appear to be left behind by the IT revolution.  
However, in its drive toward “Cyber-Korea 21,” the ROK 
government is intent to bring the digital “have-nots” into 
the information age by building ICT community access 
centers, subsidizing mobile telecommunication services, 
and promoting free public access to LANs and the Web.   
 
The digital divide between the ROK and DPRK in terms of 
ICT connectivity, capabilities, and content is growing 
exponentially, whereas inter-Korean digital interfaces are 
very few and extremely circumspect due to technological, 
economic, political, and military factors, as well as national 
security concerns.  In particular, both governments fear that 
ICT can be used for propaganda and subversion by the 
enemy, that ICT may facilitate unauthorized contacts 
between the two peoples, including spying, that ICT may 
enable unauthorized technology transfers, that ICT may 
open a highly potent venue for damage to domestic 
infrastructure, and so on.  President Kim Dae-jung’s 
“sunshine policy” and his globalization drive alleviated 
some of these fears in the South, but such internal security 
concerns are of paramount importance for the insecure and 
paranoid North.  Therefore, e-unification of Koreas remains 
a long way off.   
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However, inter-Korean e-cooperation is already here and 
intensifying.  The ICT-related trade and investment have 
already replaced textiles and food aid as the most 
significant components in the inter-Korean economic 
exchanges.  The most promising areas of e-cooperation on 
the business side include such profit-oriented joint ventures 
as the co-development of new software from games to 
animated cartoons, the South’s outsourcing of assembly of 
components for ITC products to the North, and promoting 
inter-Korean e-commerce.  On the humanitarian side, it is 
worth mentioning such not-for-profit joint e-collaboration 
activities as mediating “virtual” reunions by the Internet 
video links and e-mail among divided families, and online 
educational consulting and training in specialized areas like 
market economics, law, public administration, etc.   
 
Intensifying inter-Korean e-cooperation raises important 
policy questions for the United States.  The U.S. Trading 
with the Enemy Act and Wassenaar restrictions continue to 
prohibit the transfer of most of the ICT to the DPRK, 
including the Pentium-level computer technology and the 
CDMA technology for mobile telecommunications.  The 
rationale for these sanctions is straight-forward: if the West 
provides the North with significant computing power and 
other hi-tech innovations, one day Pyongyang may use 
them in its weapons R&D and turn them against its own 
benefactors.  A scorpion will always remain a scorpion, i.e., 
a lethal predator, no matter how difficult a situation he 
finds himself in.   
 
Surprisingly, many experts believe that the Western 
embargo on the transfer of some information technologies 
to North Korea is misguided. They advocate a wider 
introduction of IT throughout the North Korean society and 
military. Since some dual-use information and 
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communication technologies can be easily obtained on the 
global markets, why does the United States continue to 
sanction them? Any marginal IT advances are not likely to 
be sufficient to combat successfully the C4ISR and other 
digitalized capabilities of the USFK and CFC, but they will 
be quite sufficient “to politically awaken the North Korean 
public to the falsehoods and tyranny of their government.”  
In addition, the allies can actually erode and manipulate the 
KPA’s “digitally-resistant military capabilities” through the 
spread of IT-based assets and structures.  Furthermore, by 
giving IT tools to the North Korean civil society, the West 
can dilute the KPA’s political power, narrow the digital gap 
between the “military haves” and the “civilian have-nots,” 
and bring about a better balance between civilian and 
military sectors in the DPRK.  
 
The problem with the IT sanctions is further exacerbated by 
at least three factors.  First, the IT embargo is leaking like 
an old and rusty bucket: the North is already procuring very 
advanced computer technology through purchases and gifts 
from Japan, China, and Russia and is downloading rather 
sophisticated software from the Internet for free.  Clearly, 
the ROK private sector appears to miss some lucrative 
business opportunities in the DPRK because of the IT trade 
restrictions.  Second, every day the South Korean 
businesses and citizens replace thousands of old computers 
and other electronic gadgets that must go to the garbage 
dumps – or could be given to the North, which could 
alleviate the inter-Korean digital divide, if it were not for 
the U.S.-led sanctions.  Third, now that the North is 
planning to set up a nationwide mobile phone network and 
is considering which mobile standard to adopt, it is in the 
national interest of the ROK to see to it that Pyongyang 
chooses the CDMA technology rather than the GSM 
standard, whereby narrowing the digital divide and laying 
the foundation for a common future standard in mobile 
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telephony in a unified Korea.  However, the South cannot 
share the CDMA technology with the North without the 
approval of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, which 
will not be forthcoming any time soon.   
 
The IT revolution obviously puts the current U.S. policy 
towards the Korean peninsula in a spotlight.  If Washington 
persists in its strict enforcement of ITC sanctions against 
Pyongyang, the Korean public may perceive this decades-
old policy as part of a broader U.S. strategy to maintain the 
North-South division in all areas, including the digital 
division between the two Koreas.  The United States is 
well-advised to be more selective, less restrictive, and more 
far-sighted in determining which particular areas of inter-
Korean IT cooperation should be blocked or permitted.  
Integration of basic ITC standards, albeit potentially risky 
from a military standpoint, should be politically tolerable 
under the “sunshine” policy and can ultimately benefit both 
Koreas and the cause of Korean reconciliation and 
reunification.   
 
Contributions to the Present Volume 
 
The present volume is a product of an international 
conference on information technology and national security 
on the Korean peninsula, which took place at the Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, 
October 8-10, 2002.  The book’s nineteen chapters are 
divided into three parts:  Part One – Current Status of the 
Telecommunications Sector and Information Technology 
Industry in the DPRK and ROK, Part Two -- IT Revolution 
and Its Impact on Defense Modernization in the Korean 
People’s Army and Defense Digitization in the ROK armed 
forces, and Part Three -- Implications of Korean 
Information Technology Revolution on Conflict and 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia.  The aim of the book is to 
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provide a comprehensive analysis of a cutting edge topic in 
the academic and policy-oriented research on Korean 
affairs, namely the role of the information technology 
revolution in economic development and military 
competition on the Korean peninsula.  This book is a 
product of collaborative efforts by civilian (government, 
corporate, NGOs, academic) and military (Army, Air 
Force, Navy, Marines, C4ISR) experts -- practitioners with 
a vision -- from the ROK, United States, and their 
Northeast Asian allies and partners. 
 
In part one, chapters two through six examine the origins, 
driving forces, scope, main directions, and security 
implications of the development of the telecommunications 
sector and information technology revolution on the 
Korean peninsula.   In part two, chapters seven through 
twelve analyze the current status and future prospects for 
defense digitization of the ROK armed forces, examine the 
IT-related challenges facing the development of  
integrated, combined, and joint warfare capabilities in the 
Korean theatre, and discuss the impact of the IT revolution 
on the ROK national security strategy, military doctrine, 
and operational concepts.  Chapters thirteen through fifteen 
attempt to answer hard questions about the role and impact 
of IT on defense modernization in the Korean People’s 
Army, and go a long way in identifying basic trends and 
key issues in the North Korean military thinking on the use 
of IT, information systems, and information operations.   
 
In part three, chapters sixteen and seventeen discuss the 
lessons and prospects for IT-sector cooperation between 
Koreas and their Northeast Asian neighbors, in particular 
Japan and Russia.  Chapter eighteen addresses the concerns 
about the growing “digital divide” between North and 
South Koreas and proposes ways to bridge it.  Lastly, 
chapter nineteen discusses the prospects for and difficulties 
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facing the e-unification of and e-cooperation between two 
Koreas.   
 
The premise of this book is that the age of “Digital Korea” 
has already arrived on the peninsula.  E-Korea is no longer 
a dream.  It is reality.  The information technology 
revolution breaks the decades-old barriers and creates its 
own digital divides and e-challenges in the areas of 
economic development, military competition, and political 
legitimization games on the peninsula.  The digital society 
of tomorrow is gaining a foothold in both Koreas today.  
Tradition and modernity enter into a new cycle of 
confrontation and co-habituation in the digital age in 
Korea. 
]
 
